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Walking a Gray Line: The "Color of
Law" Test Governing Noncitizen
Eligibility for Public Benefits
ROBERT RUBIN*
The color of law standard appears in a wide array of public bene-
fits statutes. This Article analyzes the color of law standard in
determining eligibility of noncitizens for public benefits. It also
outlines the impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 on benefit eligibility. After reviewing legislative history and
judicial construction of the standard, the author proposes a work-
ing definition of "'permanently residing. . . under color of law"
that would include those aliens with implied or express permission
to remain in the country but exclude undocumented aliens and
those who are temporarily present.
INTRODUCTION
The eligibility standard governing noncitizen participation in vari-
ous public benefit programs has become the subject of intense debate
and litigation during the past few years. Generally, under this stan-
dard, a noncitizen must demonstrate that she is permanently residing
in the United States under color of law. Proponents for narrowly
construing the standard contend that the availability of benefits is a
lure for "illegal aliens" to enter this country.' Others dispute that
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1. The Supreme Court rejected this same argument when it was offered in sup-
port of a state law denying free public education to the children of "illegal aliens."
"'Charging tuition to undocumented children constitutes a ludicrously ineffectual at-
contention, and urge a more expansive construction to protect per-
sons permitted to remain in the United States from being denied the
means to subsist.
The eligibility of noncitizens who have been "lawfully admitted
for permanent residence" 2 is not in dispute. These persons are statu-
torily eligible for most public benefits. Rather, this Article focuses on
the eligibility of noncitizens who have not yet attained permanent
status but are in the process of securing legal status from the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS).
The current debate over alienage restrictions in public benefit pro-
grams was precipitated in 1971 by the Supreme Court's decision in
Graham v. Richardson.' Graham held that a state law denying wel-
fare benefits to resident aliens violated the equal protection clause.
To implement Graham, various laws and regulations governing bene-
fit eligibility were proposed that would provide for nondiscrimination
on the basis of alien status. Concern arose that these provisions
would permit "illegal aliens" to establish eligibility. As a result,
Congress adopted the "color of law" language to limit benefits to
those persons present with the knowledge and permission of the INS.
The phrase "color of law" first appeared in our jurisprudence in
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the "Ku Klux Klan
Act."4 While the legislative debates on the Act in 1871 are not illu-
minating for present purposes, the language did appear, shortly
thereafter, in a Supreme Court opinion: "'Color of law' does not
mean actual law. 'Color,' as a modifier, in legal parlance, means 'ap-
pearance as distinguished from reality.' Color of law means 'mere
semblance of legal right'."5
tempt to stem the tide of illegal aliens'.... The dominant incentive for illegal entry
• . . is the availability of employment; few if any illegal immigrants come to this country
.. . in order to avail themselves of a free education . . . . Furthermore, 'the available
evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize public services . . . .' Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 228 (1981). Numerous studies similarly have demonstrated that the availabil-
ity of public benefits provides little or no incentive for illegal entry. See, e.g., W. CORNE-
LIUs, THE FUTURE OF MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN CALIFORNIA: A NEW PERSPECTIVE FOR
PUBLIC POLICY (1982).
2. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20)
(1982) [hereinafter INA].
3. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1982)). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
5. McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168, 175 (1899) (annexation of property
held lawful because municipal government was acting under color of law). Black's Law
Dictionary similarly defines the term as the "appearance or semblance, without the sub-
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This historical background, although arising in a different context,
provides some early clues to the meaning of "color of law." The lan-
guage is clearly intended to include actions not covered by specific
authorizations of law. "It embraces not only situations within the
body of the law, but also others enfolded by a colorable imitation."
6
This Article analyzes the manner in which the courts presently
construe the color of law standard in the context of noncitizen eligi-
bility for public benefits.7 It reviews the relevant legislative history of
these alienage restrictions as well as the impact of the recently en-
acted Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The Article
concludes that the "color of law" language is intended to prohibit
temporarily present aliens and "undocumented aliens", from partici-
pating in the benefit programs. Restricting eligibility for other cate-
gories of aliens could result in the denial of subsistence benefits to
persons with implied or express permission to remain in this country.
Any such construction would be an improper reading of the subject
phrase and contrary to congressional purposes. Finally, the Article
proposes a working definition of "permanently residing .. .under
color of law" that can be applied without resort to complex analyses
of various provisions of immigration law and is sufficiently flexible to
accommodate subsequent developments in the law.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF "PERMANENTLY RESIDING UNDER
COLOR OF LAW"
Congress addressed the color of law standard on several occasions,
when it considered enactment of alienage restrictions for the Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI), Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), Unemployment Insurance, Medicaid, and Food
Stamp programs. This legislative history reveals a common theme.
The subject language was employed for the purpose of excluding two
classes - "illegal aliens" and temporarily present aliens, such as
stance, of legal right." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 331 (4th ed. 1968).
6. Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom.
Shang v. Holley, 435 U.S. 947 (1978).
7. The primary focus will be on eligibility for Aid to Families With Dependent
Children, Medicaid, Unemployment Insurance, and Supplemental Security Income, all
of which employ the color of law test.
8. "Undocumented alien" is used to identify a person who either entered the
country without inspection or overstayed a validly issued visa and who is not in the pro-
cess of securing documentation from INS. Although it is not a connotation favored by
the author, the undocumented are often referred to as "illegal aliens." The term is a
misnomer as it erroneously suggests that persons referred to as such have committed a
criminal offense.
tourists, students and temporary workers.
Other than excluding these two classes, Congress' earliest concern,
expressed in the SSI debates, in establishing benefit eligibility for
persons under color of law was to provide for the needs of persons
fleeing persecution. These were not persons who already had been
granted legal refugee status but rather applicants seeking to attain
such status. In employing the color of law standard, Congress in-
tended that a humanitarian approach be taken toward the transi-
tional needs of noncitizens, particularly those fleeing persecution,
who are permitted to remain in this country while seeking to legalize
their status.
SSI
The color of law test for noncitizen eligibility was initially adopted
in 1972 as part of the SSI program of cash benefits to the aged,
blind, and disabled. 9 For eligible persons, the SSI benefit may pro-
vide a total monthly income or supplement a low monthly income. In
addition to cash payments, SSI recipients are automatically covered
by Medicaid and may be eligible for In-Home Supportive Services
(for example, housework or personal care). 10
To be eligible for SSI, a person must be either a citizen, a perma-
nent resident alien or "otherwise permanently residing in the United
States under color of law (including any alien who is lawfully pre-
sent in the United States as a result of the application of the provi-
sions of section 1153 (a)(7)" or section 1182 (d)(5) 12 of Title 8).' 13
Congress specifically provides that the term "'including' when used
in a definition . . . shall not be deemed to exclude other things oth-
erwise within the meaning of the term defined."' 4 Moreover, the
courts have consistently found that "the categories listed in the par-
enthetical are illustrative rather than definitive."' 5 Thus, color of law
9. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1382.
10. Id.
11. When section 1382c(a)(1)(B)(ii) of Title 42 was enacted in 1972, section
1153(a)(7) of title 8 provided in pertinent part: "Conditional entries shall ...be made
available by the Attorney General . . .to aliens who. . . because of persecution or fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion ...have fled [certain
designated areas] ...; or . . .are persons uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity
." INA § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7).
12. When section 1382c(a)(1)(B)(ii) was enacted, section 1182(d)(5) of Title 8
provided in pertinent part: "The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the
United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent rea-
sons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission
to the United States ... " INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1301(b).
15. Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1572 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Holley v.
Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 851 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Shang v. Holley, 435
U.S. 947 (1978).
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status is not limited to the examples set forth in the parenthetical.
As originally proposed by the House, SSI eligibility was limited
only to aliens who were lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 16
Concern was expressed, however, regarding the eligibility of Cuban
parolees and conditional entrants who were not admitted as perma-
nent residents. During the Senate deliberations on the bill, therefore,
Senator Chiles of Florida proposed an amendment (on behalf of
himself and Senator Gurney) which would require the use of the
color of law standard in establishing alien eligibility. 17 Senator
Gurney explained the purpose of imposing the standard:
MR. GURNEY: Mr. President, these amendments which we are introduc-
ing at this time are designed to prevent a great and unintended economic
hardship being placed upon the people of Dade County, Fla .....
Florida has about 12,000 refugees from Communist Cuba within its borders
who are either over 65 years of age, blind, or disabled. At my request,
HEW has provided an estimate that the payments for these individuals are
about $18 million per year .... Mr. President, the Cuban refugee program
is one of federal responsibility and the State of Florida should not be re-
quired to bear the cost of that commitment alone. The categories of eligi-
bility must, in all fairness, be amended to include these political refu-
gees .... Moreover, under international protocols of general application,
the United States has agreed to accord refugees staying in its territory
equal treatment. If these amendments are not approved, the State of Flor-
ida, and Dade County will be forced to pay for programs which ought to
be supported by the Federal Government. I am sure that this is not what
the Members of this body want.18
In agreeing to the amendment en bloc, the Senate thereby ac-
cepted federal responsibility for providing welfare benefits to nonci-
tizens seeking refuge in the United States as a result of a program
established by the federal government. By inserting the subject
phrase into the statute defining alien eligibility for SSI benefits, the
full Senate implicitly adopted the principle enunciated by Senator
Gurney: whenever the federal government is responsible for inviting
or permitting the presence of aliens in this country, the federal gov-
ernment should bear the costs of providing subsistence benefits to
these needy aliens.
AFDC
The AFDC program is a creation of the Social Security Act of
1935 and is funded jointly by the state and federal governments. Its
16. H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4989, 5322.
17. 118 CONG. REC. 33,959 (1972).
18. Id. (emphasis added).
purpose is to provide subsistence benefits to needy children who are
living in the home of a parent or certain relatives, or are under foster
care. Caretaker relatives are included in the program if they meet
the eligibility requirements. In addition to cash payments, AFDC re-
cipients are automatically covered by Medicaid.'
In order for a child to be eligible for AFDC or for a caretaker
relative to be taken into account in calculating the amount of aid
which the child will receive,20 the child or relative must be either a
citizen, a permanent resident alien or
otherwise permanently residing in the United States under color of law (in-
cluding any alien who is lawfully present in the United States as a result of
the application of the provisions of section 1157(c)21 of Title 8 (or of section
1153(a)(7) of Title 8 prior to April 1, 1980), or as a result of the applica-
tion of the provisions of section 115822 or 1182(d)(5) of Title 8).2
3
In 1973, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) proposed to use the "color of law" phrase as a test of nonci-
tizen eligibility for AFDC with the purpose of "implement[ing] the
Supreme Court decision in Graham v. Richardson."24 The landmark
decision in Graham25 proclaimed that state classifications based on
alienage are inherently suspect and should be subjected to close judi-
cial scrutiny.26 The Court in Graham thus struck down a state law
which denied welfare benefits to aliens based on residency.
In response to Graham, HEW initially proposed an AFDC regula-
tion which provided that a "[s]tate plan may not exclude an other-
wise eligible individual solely on the basis that he is not a citizen, or
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615.
20. In Darces v. Woods, 35 Cal. 3d 871, 679 P.2d 458, 201 Cal. Rptr. 807
(1984), citizen children who were receiving AFDC benefits challenged a regulation that
excluded undocumented alien children from being considered in calculating the needs of
the family budget unit, thereby reducing the size of the total grant paid to a family
composed of both eligible citizen children and ineligible alien children. The California
Supreme Court held that the regulation violated the equal protection clause of the state
constitution and that the needs of the undocumented alien children must be included in
determining the AFDC benefit level.
21. Section 1157(c) relates to the discretionary power of the Attorney General to
"admit any refugee [as defined under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)] who is not firmly
resettled in any foreign country, is determined to be of special humanitarian concern to
the United States, and is admissible . . . as an immigrant under this Act." INA §
207(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1).
22. Section 1158(a) requires the Attorney General to establish:
a procedure for an alien physically present in the United States or at a land
border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum,
and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General
if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the
meaning of [INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A)].
INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(33).
24. 38 Fed. Reg. 16,910 (1973) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.50, 248.50).
25. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
26. Id. at 376.
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because of his alien status. 12 7 The proposed regulation, however,
brought opposition to granting aid to aliens not lawfully present in
this country, that is, "illegal aliens." '28 In response to this opposition,
HEW proposed instead:
to require that a State plan must include any otherwise eligible resident of
the United States who is either a citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence or otherwise permanently residing in the United States
under color of law; and must exclude any individual who is not lawfully in
this country.
29
This new language was adopted and codified at 45 C.F.R. §
233.50.30
In 1981, the regulatory language provided the basis for a statutory
amendment to the Social Security Act. In addition to setting forth
the color of law test for AFDC eligibility, the new statute made spe-
cific reference to the refugee and asylum provisions of 8 U.S.C. §§
1157 and 1158.3 1 Any individual "lawfully present. . . as a result of
the application of" either of these two provisions is to be considered
"permanently residing . . . under color of law."' 2 References to the
refugee and asylum statutes were added as a result of their enact-
ment under the Refugee Act of 1980.3
Unemployment Insurance
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act was designed to encourage a
uniform system of unemployment compensation by the states. Its
purpose is to assist in stabilization of employment conditions and to
ameliorate conditions of unemployment. Unemployment insurance
essentially involves the compulsory setting aside of funds to be used
for a system that provides benefits for persons unemployed through
27. 37 Fed. Reg. 11,977 (1972) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.50, 248.50).
28. 38 Fed. Reg. 16,911 (1973) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.50, 248.50).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. In adopting this regulatory language, the Secretary of HEW stated that
"[n]othing in this regulation would preclude a State from adopting as an administrative
procedure, the California method of certification followed by verification with Federal
Immigration authorities to determine alien status." 38 Fed. Reg. 30,259 (1973). In Cali-
fornia, an alien could certify that "he [was] not under order for deportation" and if the
INS verified the certification, the alien was eligible to receive AFDC benefits. Former
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11104 (West 1980). Thus, an alien certified as not under an
order for deportation satisfied the test which the Secretary found acceptable for deter-
mining whether an alien was "permanently residing in the United States under ... color
of law."
31. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(33). See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
32. 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(33).
33. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 103-105 (1980) (codified
at INA §§ 207, 208, 8 U.S.C. 1157, 1158).
no fault of their own.3 4
In order for an alien to be eligible for unemployment compensa-
tion, the person must be
an individual who was lawfully admitted for permanent residence at the
time such services were performed, was lawfully present for purposes of
performing such services, or was permanently residing in the United States
under color of law at the time such services were performed (including an
alien who was lawfully present in the United States as a result of the appli-
cation of the provisions of section 203(a)(7) [8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)] or
section 212(d)(5) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)] of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act)."
In addition to this federal requirement, many states require that the
individual be "available for work" at the time benefits are sought."
The so-called "able and available" provision has been interpreted by
certain courts to require an alien to be authorized to work by the
INS in order to receive unemployment benefits.37 The absence of
work authorization, however, does not affect one's ability to establish
color of law status.3 8
Congress employed the "color of law" language in the Federal
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976 "to prevent the
payment of unemployment compensation to illegal aliens who work
in the United States."39 In establishing alien eligibility for unem-
ployment compensation, the Senate wished "to make it clear that
unemployment compensation will not be paid on the basis of services
performed by aliens unless such services are performed by aliens
during periods in which they were lawfully present in the United
States."4 Although Congress also considered a requirement that the
noncitizen maintain a particular status at the time benefits were
sought,4 ' the final language of the bill focused solely on immigration
34. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1982); 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (1982).
36. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1253 (West 1986).
37. See Alonso v. State, 50 Cal. App. 3d 242, 123 Cal. Rptr. 536, cert. denied,
425 U.S. 903 (1976); Duenas-Rodriguez v. Industrial Comm'n, 199 Colo. 95, 606 P.2d
437 (1980); Pinilla v. Board of Review, Dep't of Lab. & Ind., 155 N.J. Super. 307, 382
A.2d 921 (1978). This construction of "able and available" finds support in the employer
sanctions provision of the reform legislation, which, for the first time, makes it unlawful
for an employer to hire a noncitizen without work authorization. Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101(a), 100 Stat. 3357, 3360 (1987)
(amending/adding INA § 274A). See also infra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
38. See Memorandum of Amicus Curiae for United States Department of Labor
and United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, Ibarra v. Texas Employment
Comm'n, 598 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Tex. 1984).
39. S. REP. No. 67, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 79, 91.
40. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 158, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 98, 103.
41. S. REP. No. 67, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 79, 91-92.
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status at the time "such services were performed."42
Medicaid
Medicaid is a benefit program which pays for medical care for
public assistance recipients and other low-income persons. It is
jointly funded by the state and federal governments. AFDC and SSI
recipients are automatically eligible for Medicaid. If individuals are
otherwise eligible for AFDC or SSI, except that their income is
slightly above the need standard, they still qualify for Medicaid.43
Pursuant to a regulation promulgated in 1973, an individual seek-
ing Medicaid benefits must be a United States citizen, a permanent
resident alien or "permanently residing in the United States under
color of law, including any alien who is lawfully present in the
United States under section 203(a)(7) or section 212(d)(5) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.' 44 Under the terms of the state-
administered Medi-Cal program in California, a less restrictive stan-
dard is employed and benefits are to be provided to "any alien who is
otherwise eligible for health care services . . . if the alien certifies
under penalty of perjury that to the best of his knowledge he is in
the country legally and is entitled to remain indefinitely, or if he
certifies that he is not under order for deportation, or if he certifies
that he is married to an individual not under order for
deportation.
'45
Unlike the other benefit programs in which Congress specifically
imposed alienage restrictions, the Medicaid statute, until recently,
was silent on the question of alien eligibility. Nonetheless, since
1973, the HEW (now, Department of Health and Human Services)
has imposed alienage requirements by regulation. 46 The Secretary
has taken the position that the Medicaid statute incorporates by ref-
erence the alienage requirements explicitly set forth in both the
AFDC and SSI statutes. As such, eligibility under the regulation has
been limited to permanent resident aliens and those "permanently
residing . . . under color of law."47
A class of noncitizens recently challenged the Secretary's author-
ity to impose alienage restrictions in the Medicaid program. In Lewis
42. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(e).
44. 42 C.F.R. § 435.402 (1986).
45. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14007.5 (1982). See Dermegerdich v. Rank, 151
Cal. App. 3d 848, 199 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1984).
46. 42 C.F.R. § 435.402 (1986).
47. Id.
v. Gross,48 a federal district court in New York held that the regula-
tory language had been promulgated without congressional authori-
zation. "Congress. . . knew how to impose alienage requirements on
social welfare programs when it intended, and its refusal to impose
such a requirement on Medicaid should be respected. '49
In response to Lewis, a bill was immediately introduced and subse-
quently passed by Congress which effectively overruled this deci-
sion.50 While statutorily mandating a color of law requirement for
Medicaid, Congress also provided that, without regard to alienage,
the treatment of an emergency medical condition "shall be covered
by Medicaid if the patient otherwise meets the eligibility require-
ments for medical assistance under the State plan ... ."1 This pro-
vision clearly contemplates that undocumented aliens can establish
Medicaid eligibility for emergency services.
Food Stamps
The Food Stamp program is a nutrition assistance program
designed to allow low-income persons to purchase essential food
items and improve their diets. The Department of Agriculture pays
all costs of the food stamps themselves although the program is run
by the states. Food stamps are available to households consisting of a
single individual, or a group of people living together who buy food
and prepare meals together. The household's income and resources
must be within the program's financial eligibility standards. Food
stamps may be used to purchase any food item except alcoholic bev-
erages, tobacco, or pet food.52
The alienage restrictions embodied in the food stamp program are
the most restrictive of the public assistance programs. There is no
color of law standard 58 but rather specific categories of eligible
aliens.5" Such categories include permanent resident aliens, refugees,
asylees, aliens who have resided continuously in the United States
since June 29, 1948, conditional entrants, parolees, and aliens
granted withholding of deportation.55
While discussing alien eligibility for food stamps during its de-
bates on the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, Congress considered
48. No. 79 Civ. 1740 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 1986).
49. Id., slip op. at 54.
50. H.R. REP. No. 727, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., I 11(1986).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v).
52. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2029 (1982).
53. Until 1977, the food stamp program did employ the color of law criterion for
alien eligibility. 39 Fed. Reg. 3643 (1974) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 271.1(e)(1986)).
54. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(0.
55. 7 C.F.R. § 273.4 (1986). These categories will have to be expanded to main-
tain consistency with the changes effected by Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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the meaning of color of law. Congressional understanding of the
phrase expanded somewhat between 1972 and 1977. In 1972, Sena-
tor Gurney offered parolees and conditional entrants as examples.56
By 1977, Congress indicated that the following groups of aliens also
met the color of law test: (1) permanent residents under color of law
who have maintained continuous residence since before June 30,
1948; (2) aliens granted indefinite voluntary departure; (3) aliens
granted an indefinite stay of deportation by INS "for humanitarian
reasons or because of insuperable technical difficulties affecting their
deportation. 57 In so doing, Congress reiterated its chief concern that
the purpose of limiting noncitizen eligibility to aliens permanently
residing under color of law was to exclude aliens temporarily pre-




General Assistance (or General Relief) is a cash benefit program
of "last resort;" that is, for persons not otherwise eligible for AFDC
or SSI."9 Its requirements vary depending upon state or county re-
quirements. In California, the state statute does not impose an alien-
age restriction, but instead requires the individual to be a
"resident." 60
IMPLICATIONS OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT
ON COLOR OF LAW
In debating the major immigration reform bill last year, Congress
addressed the color of law standard for the AFDC, SSI, Medicaid,
56. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
57. H.R. REP. No. 464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1978, 2116.
58. Id. Congress similarly reaffirmed that its intent in 1972 in originally enacting
the "color of law" test for the SSI program was to exclude "illegal and temporarily
present aliens." Id.
59. See, e.g., CALF. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 17000-17410 (West 1980 & Supp.
1986).
60. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1986). Although counties have
attempted to impose color of law alienage restrictions, noncitizens have challenged suc-
cessfully the denial of General Assistance benefits on the basis of having satisfied the
state residency requirement. See Perdomo v. City and County of San Francisco No. 852-
639 (Cal. Super. Ct., Mar. 13, 1986). Indeed, in California, undocumented aliens have
been deemed state residents for purposes of tuition fees at state colleges and universities.
Leticia "A" v. Board of Regents, No. 588-982-5 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 5, 1985, unre-
ported decision), 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 639-41 (1985).
and Unemployment Insurance programs. Section 121(c) 1 proposed
to limit the definition of "permanently residing in the United States
under color of law" to five specific categories of noncitizens.62 The
enumerated classes essentially encompassed various "refugee" cate-
gories and persons who entered the United States prior to June 30,
1948.
The major impact of such legislation would have been a definitive
listing of persons satisfying the color of law standard. Under the ex-
isting statutes and regulations for AFDC, SSI, Medicaid, and Un-
employment Insurance programs, the listing of eligible aliens is pref-
aced by the term "including. 63 General rules of statutory
construction and judicial interpretation have affirmed that the cate-
gories following "including" must be viewed as examples and not as
an exhaustive list.64 Under the proposed legislation, however, the list-
ing of eligible aliens was preceded by the clause: "only the following
aliens shall be considered to be aliens permanently residing in the
United States under color of law."'6 5 By providing for a definitive
listing, this language would have foreclosed any further development
of the common law in construing the color of law test.
After intense lobbying, the House Judiciary Committee removed
this language from the bill.66 The final version, passed on November
6, 1986, contains no such limited definition. Thus, while enactment
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act6 7 (IRCA) has some im-
plications for the interpretation of "permanently residing . . . under
color of law," this standard will apparently maintain the elasticity
that allows it to be interpreted over time in accord with develop-
ments in immigration law and practice.
In enacting IRCA, Congress employed an alternative approach to
analyzing the standard of "permanently residing under color of law."
Under the legalization provisions, IRCA creates a new immigration
status - "Lawful Temporary Resident" (LTR). Instead of deter-
mining whether an LTR is under color of law, however, IRCA ap-
61. H.R. 3810, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 121(c) (1985).
62. Id. The categories consisted of: (1) aliens who entered the United States prior
to June 30, 1948; (2) aliens admitted as refugees pursuant to INA § 207, 8 U.S.C. §
1157, granted asylum pursuant to INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, or who entered on a
conditional basis before April 1, 1980 pursuant to INA § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. §
1153(a)(7) (as in effect before such date); (3) aliens paroled for a period of at least five
years pursuant to INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5); (4) aliens granted withhold-
ing of deportation pursuant to INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h); and (5) aliens granted
deferred action status pursuant to INS operations instructions.
63. See supra notes 13, 23, 35, 44 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
65. H.R. 3810, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 121(c) (1985).
66. H.R. 3810, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., § 121 (1986).
67. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (1987) [hereinafter IRCA].
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plies varying standards of program eligibility dependent upon the
specific public benefit sought. Furthermore, while IRCA leaves open
the question of whether LTRs are under color of law for purposes of
federal law, it resorts to an ad hoc approach to state-funded program
eligibility. This does little to clarify the color of lawg' standard.
LTR status may be granted under three different sections of
IRCA: the legalization provisions, 8 the special agricultural worker
(SAW) provisions,60 and the additional special or replenishment ag-
ricultural worker (RAW) provisions.7 0 Though the vehicle for secur-
ing LTR status may vary, the status, once obtained, satisfies the au-
thor's proposed "color of law" test 71 requiring evidence of an INS
policy or practice to allow a noncitizen to remain in the United
States.
Indicia of color of law status are found in various sections of
IRCA which evidence a governmental policy to allow LTRs to re-
main lawfully in the United States so long as they maintain such
status. Noncitizens who have been granted LTR status may not be
deported unless their status is terminated. 2 Furthermore, they are
authorized to be employed in the United States and may travel
abroad without jeopardizing this status. 3 Even aliens apprehended
prior to the legalization application period will receive a temporary
stay of deportation/exclusion and temporary work authorization if
they present a prima facie application (when they seek legalization),
or a nonfrivolous application (when they seek SAW status) to the
INS.7 4 IRCA contains still stronger language which considers legal-
ized SAWs and RAWs to be "lawful permanent residents" unless
expressly provided otherwise.75 Thus, they should receive benefits, if
otherwise eligible, without regard to color of law status.
Consistent with its refusal to limit color of law status to only cer-
68. IRCA § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3394 (amending/adding INA § 245A).
69. Id. § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3417 (amending/adding INA § 210).
70. Id. § 303(a), 100 Stat. at 3422 (amending/adding INA § 210A).
71. For the proposed definition, see infra notes 230-40 and accompanying text.
72. IRCA § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3396 (amending/adding INA § 245A(b)(2) (le-
galization provision); id. § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3421 (amending/adding INA §
210(a)(3)) (SAW provision); id. § 303(a), 100 Stat. at 3428 (amending/adding INA §
210A(d)(2) (RAW provision).
73. Id. § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3396-97 (amending/adding INA § 245A(b)(3))
(legalization); id. § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3418 (amending/adding INA § 210(a)(4))
(SAW); id. § 303(a), 100 Stat. at 3428 (amending/adding INA § 210A(d)(3)) (RAW).
74. Id. § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3399 (amending/adding INA § 245A(e)) (legaliza-
tion); id. § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3421 (amending/adding INA § 210(d)) (SAW).
75. Id. § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3418 (amending/adding INA § 210(a)(5)) (SAW);
id. § 303a, 100 Stat. at 3428 (amending/adding INA § 210A(d)(4)) (RAW).
tain categories of aliens, Congress placed no restrictions in IRCA
regarding whether legalization LTRs are under color of law for pur-
poses of federal law. Therefore, under traditional color of law analy-
sis, they should be recognized as meeting the standard. IRCA does
provide, however, that other than for enumerated exceptions (dis-
cussed below), legalization LTRs are not to be considered "perma-
nently residing . . . under color of law" for purposes of state-funded
financial assistance programs.76
Finally, all three categories of LTRs are disqualified from certain
federal financial assistance for a five-year period beginning on the
date the alien obtained such status.7 Although LTRs may adjust
their status to that of an alien "lawfully admitted for permanent res-




The provisions governing the federal SSI program contain the
most straightforward standards of eligibility for assistance programs
under IRCA. The five-year disqualification does not apply. And be-
cause legalization LTRs meet the color of law standard and SAW
and RAW LTRs are to be considered "lawful permanent residents,"
all three categories should be eligible for SSI.s °
76. Id. § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3401 (amending/adding INA § 245A(h)(l)).
77. Id., 100 Stat. at 3401 (amending/adding INA § 245A(h)) (legalization); Id.§ 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3422 (amending/adding INA § 210(0) (SAW); id. § 303a, 100
Stat. at 3429 (amending/adding INA § 210A(d)(6)) (RAW).
78. Id. § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3395 (amending/adding INA § 245A(b)) (legaliza-
tion); id. § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3417 (amending/adding INA § 210(a)(2)) (SAW); id. §303(a), 100 Stat. at 3428 (amending/adding INA § 210A(d)(l)) (RAW).
79. In those instances in which a LTR establishes eligibility for a benefit programduring this five-year period, the alien might become subject to the "public charge" exclu-sion. The "public charge" exclusion provision applies generally to aliens seeking to immi-
grate and provides that they shall be excluded from admission if they "are likely at anytime to become public charges." INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(15). Under IRCA,there is a special rule for determination of public charge which allows the alien to avoid
this ground of inadmissibility "if the alien demonstrates a history of employment in theUnited States evidencing self-support without receipt of public cash assistance." IRCA §201(a), 100 Stat. at 3399 (amending/adding INA § 245A(d)(2)(B)(iii)) (legalization);
id. § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3420 (amending/adding INA § 210(c)(2)(C)) (SAW); id. §303(a), 100 Stat. at 3429 (amending/adding INA § 210A(e)(2)(C)) (RAW). Thus, re-
ceipt of public benefits could jeopardize an alien's ability to obtain legal status generally
or pursuant to the IRCA provisions.
80. IRCA § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3401-02 (amending/adding INA § 245A(h)(2)(b)) (legalization); id. § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3422 (amending/adding INA § 210(0)(SAW); id. § 303(a), 100 Stat. at 3429 (amending/adding INA § 210A(d)(6)) (RAW).
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AFDC
All three categories of LTRs are disqualified from receiving
AFDC benefits."' The only exception to the five-year ineligibility pe-
riod is for Cuban/Haitian entrants who adjust to LTR status; they
are eligible to receive AFDC benefits.8 2
Unemployment Insurance
IRCA does not specifically refer to eligibility for unemployment
insurance. Unemployment insurance programs generally do employ
color of law standards, however, and because legalization LTRs are
not under color of law for purposes of state financial assistance, they
may be ineligible for such state-funded benefits. But, to the degree
these benefits are considered a form of insurance and not a program
of financial assistance, this restriction would not apply. In either
case, legalization LTRs are eligible to adjust their status to that of a
lawful permanent resident after eighteen months.8 3 Moreover, upon
adjustment, they are no longer subject to the statutory limitation on
being considered under color of law, which applies only while one is
in LTR status.8 4 No such restrictions on those legalized under the
SAW and RAW programs exist, and because they are to be consid-
ered "lawful permanent residents," they should be eligible for unem-
ployment insurance.
Any person granted LTR status will also have been granted em-
ployment authorization. 5 That person, therefore, should satisfy the
"able and available"8' requirement imposed under most unemploy-
ment insurance programs. Thus, subject to the color of law limita-
tions set out above, these individuals should be eligible for unemploy-
ment insurance.
81. Id. § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3401 (amending/adding INA § 245A(h)(1)(A)(i))
(legalization); id. § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3422 (amending/adding INA § 210(0) (SAW);
id. § 303(a), 100 Stat. at 3429 (amending/adding § 210A(d)(6)) (RAW).
82. Id. § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3401 (amending/adding INA § 245A(h)(2)(A)).
83. Id., 100 Stat. at 3395 (amending/adding INA § 245A(b)(1)(A)).
84. Id., 100 Stat. at 3401 (amending/adding INA § 245A(h)(1)).
85. Id. § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3399 (amending/adding INA § 245A(e)) (legaliza-
tion); id. § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3418 (amending/adding INA § 210(a)(4)) (SAW); id. §
303(a), 100 Stat. at 3428 (amending/adding INA § 210A(d)(3)) (RAW).
86. The impact of the IRCA employer sanctions provisions on aliens without
work authorization and on the "able and available" requirement is more fully discussed
infra notes 206-28 and accompanying text.
Medicaid
Legalization LTRs are subject generally to the five-year disqualifi-
cation for Medicaid eligibility. 7 There are five categories of LTRs,
however, who are Medicaid-eligible: Cuban/Haitian entrants, per-
sons who are aged, blind, or disabled (that is, SSI recipients), chil-
dren under 18,88 pregnant women, and persons needing emergency
services.89 For these categories, the general restriction on LTRs be-
ing considered under color of law does not apply90 and for purposes
of Medicaid, these persons are to be considered under color of law. 1
The Medicaid provisions for RAW LTRs apply in the same man-
ner as for legalization LTRs.92 For SAW LTRs, who would be eligi-
ble for AFDC but for the general disqualification, the Medicaid pro-
visions also apply as set out above.93 For SAWs not otherwise
eligible for AFDC, Medicaid benefits should be provided in the same
manner as for other persons "lawfully admitted for permanent
residence."94
Food Stamps
The general food stamp statute does not employ a color of law
requirement. Instead, it sets forth an exhaustive list of specific cate-
gories of noncitizens who are eligible.95 IRCA creates new categories
of noncitizens who should be added to the list.
Legalization LTRs are expressly ineligible to receive food stamps
for five years.98 Individuals who obtain LTR status through the
SAW provisions are eligible for food stamps because they are to be
considered aliens "lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 97 Fi-
nally, IRCA specifically provides that LTRs granted legalization
under the RAW provisions are eligible to receive food stamps.9 8 To
achieve consistency between IRCA and the food stamp statute, Con-
87. IRCA § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3401 (amending/adding INA § 245A(h)(l)
(A)(ii)).
88. Id., 100 Stat. at 3402 (amending/adding INA § 245A(h)(3)(B)(ii)).
89. Id. (amending/adding INA § 245A(h)(3)(B)(i)).
90. Id., 100 Stat. at 3401 (amending/adding INA § 245A(h)(1)). Recognizing
the heightened importance of health services for indigent persons, Congress provided thatthis limitation on color of law status for LTRs applies only to a program of "financial
assistance" and not "medical assistance" as defined in the IRCA. Id., 100 Stat. at 3402
(amending/adding INA § 245A(h)(3)(C)).
91. Id., 100 Stat. at 3401 (amending/adding INA § 245A(h)(3)(A)(iii)).
92. Id. § 303(a), 100 Stat. at 3429 (amending/adding INA § 210A(d)(6)).
93. Id. § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3422 (amending/adding INA § 210(f)).
94. Id. (amending/adding INA § 210(g)).
95. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(0. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
96. IRCA § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3401 (amending/adding INA § 245A(h)(1)
(A)(iii)).
97. Id. § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3422 (amending/adding INA § 210(g)); see also
supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
98. Id. § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3429 (amending/adding INA § 210A(d)(6)).
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gress should amend the latter to include the categories outlined
above.
Congress, through its arbitrary categorizations in IRCA, has
clouded the doctrinal development of color of law. While perhaps
politically expedient, Congress' use of internally inconsistent criteria
dependent upon the benefit sought does little to clarify its purpose in
employing the color of law standard. It remains incumbent on the
courts, therefore, to reconcile the conflicting signals sent by Congress
and construe "color of law" in a manner allowing for flexible appli-
cation over time.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF "PERMANENTLY RESIDING UNDER
COLOR OF LAW"
Over the past fifteen years, Congress has passed laws restricting
noncitizen eligibility for governmental benefits. It has declined to de-
lineate, however, the precise categories of aliens who are to be con-
sidered "permanently residing . . . under color of law." Without ex-
plicit guidance from Congress, administrative agencies may adopt
their own laws and regulations to comply with the federal statutes.
99
Judicial review of these implementing policies is the subject of this
section.10 0
Color of law litigation traditionally focuses on the eligibility of va-
rious categories of noncitizens who have applied for and are awaiting
adjudication of a change in their immigration status.1
0 1 For many of
these individuals, the INS is prohibited by law, policy or practice
from enforcing their departure while they remain in such applicant
status. For others, the INS has simply "acquiesced" to their contin-
99. See Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
100. Under traditional equal protection analysis, state laws disadvantaging aliens
are subjected to heightened scrutiny and must generally be supported by a compelling
governmental interest, (see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)), while similar
federal laws are valid unless "wholly irrational." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83
(1976). One court has held, however, that when a state employs the federal "color of
law" classification, it is reviewable under the relaxed scrutiny standard. Sudomir v. Mc-
Mahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1464-67 (9th Cir. 1985). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
226 (1981) (although a state "may borrow the federal classification", it must be "reason-
ably adapted to 'the purposes for which the state desires to use it.' "). This Article does
not attempt to resolve this constitutional question, but instead focuses on the proper stat-
utory construction of "color of law."
101. For example, applicants for adjustment of status to that of permanent resi-
dent through an immediate relative (INA § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1151) or a "preference
status" (INA § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153); applicants for asylum (INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. §
1158); and applicants for suspension of deportation (INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254).
ued presence. Thus, the point of contention is whether a particular
applicant status satisfies the "color of law" standard.
This Article surveys twenty reported state and federal court deci-
sions that considered the meaning of the subject phrase. Fifteen de-
cisions held that aliens in various applicant statuses met the color of
law test, three decisions found opposite results, and two cases were
remanded with strong suggestions that the individuals satisfied the
standard. Twelve of the twenty decisions involved claims for unem-
ployment insurance, a context in which courts have taken a particu-
larly expansive approach in considering color of law claims. The Col-
orado state court system, for example, has issued four decisions
recognizing color of law status in the unemployment insurance area.
Given that sixteen of the reported decisions were rendered since
1984, it is still somewhat early to discern doctrinal trends. Nonethe-
less, the following analysis highlights some of the common factors
relied upon by the courts in construing the color of law standard and
suggests a general direction in which the common law appears to be
developing. Structurally, the analysis examines the subject phrase as
two concepts: "permanently residing" and "under color of law."
"Permanently Residing"
Unlike "under color of law," which is not defined in the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA), the term "permanently residing" is
more easily construed by reference to the INA. "Permanent" is de-
fined at section 101(a)(31): "The term 'permanent' means a rela-
tionship of continuing or lasting nature, as distinguished from tem-
porary, but a relationship may be permanent even though it is one
that may be dissolved eventually at the instance either of the United
States or of the individual, in accordance with law."' 02
"Residence" is defined in the same section of the INA: "The term'residence' means the place of general abode; the place of general
abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling place in fact,
without regard to intent."'10 3
The most careful analysis of "permanently residing" is found in a
Second Circuit decision, Holley v. Lavine.104 In Holley, a Canadian
citizen who overstayed her temporary student visa (and was there-
fore illegally in the United States) was informed by the INS that it
did "not contemplate enforcing her departure from the United States
at this time."'10 5 The INS assured her that she would not be deported
at least until her children, who were United States citizens, were no
102. INA § 101(a)(31), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31).
103. Id. § 101(a)(33), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(33).
104. 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Shang. v. Holley, 435
U.S. 947 (1978).
105. Id. at 849.
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longer dependent upon her. She applied for AFDC benefits for her
children as an indigent mother. As an "ineligible" alien caretaker
relative, however, she was excluded from the AFDC grant. Yet, al-
though she was "unlawfully residing in the United States" and sub-
ject to deportation, the court held that she was "permanently resid-
ing in the United States under color of law" 106 and entitled to
AFDC benefits, because the INS allowed her to remain here at least
for the time that her children were dependent upon her.
The Holley court found more interpretive assistance by looking to
the examples in the applicable regulation 10 7 outlining which aliens
are permanently residing in the United States: conditional entrants
under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7), and temporary parolees under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). 10 8 The court stated that "[tihose sections are
themselves instances where the alien is permitted to stay in the
United States not necessarily forever, but only so long as he is in a
particular condition."109 Manifestly, a "conditional" entrant and a
"temporary" parolee are not residing permanently in the United
States if that term is to be narrowly construed. In Holley, the alien
thus permanently was residing in the United States because she was
permitted to stay while she was in that "particular condition" - as
long as her children remained dependent upon her. 110
The next court to construe "permanently residing" took a decid-
edly different approach. In Sudomir v. McMahon,"" the Ninth Cir-
cuit addressed the issue in the context of applicants for political asy-
lum. 11 2 Upon plaintiffs' application for asylum, the INS, by policy,
"stayed the institution of deportation proceedings pending the dispo-
sition of [the] application."11 3 Asylum applicants typically wait
"from three to six years"114 for their asylum applications to be fi-
nally adjudicated. Nonetheless, the court concluded that asylum ap-
plicants "reside temporarily" because "the alien's continued presence
is solely dependent on the possibility of having his application for
106. Id. at 847.
107. Id. at 850-51. The AFDC statutory restriction, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(33), was
not enacted until 1981, subsequent to the decision in Holley.
108. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.50.
109. Holley, 553 F.2d at 851 (emphasis added).
110. Id.
111. 767 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1985).
112. See INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
113. Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1458; see INS Form 1-589 1 4 (Request for Asylum in
the United States) ("You may remain in the United States until a final decision is made
on your case. . . ."); 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(e)(4).
114. Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1467 (Canby, J., dissenting).
asylum acted upon favorably." 1 5
In so holding, the court appears to misapply the definition of "per-
manent" contained in the INA.116 The residence of asylum appli-
cants in this country is, in accordance with the statutory definition,"of continuing or lasting nature."117 Such residency will last at least
three to six years and much longer for those ultimately granted asy-
lum. "Most important, plaintiffs' status is easily 'distinguished from
temporary' as the statute specifies."" 8
Section 1101(a) of the INA uses "temporary" to refer to certain
classes of aliens who have "a residence in a foreign country which
[they have] no intention of abandoning."'' 19 "The common character-
istics of all these temporary relationships is that they exist for a de-
fined purpose with a defined end, and there is never any intention of
abandoning the country of origin as a home."'' 0 By contrast, appli-
cants for asylum are necessarily "unable or unwilling to return"'21
to their countries. Thus, they clearly have expressed their intention
of abandoning their foreign residence. "[Asylum applicants] are here
in an indefinite status awaiting a ruling on their application
.. ,. . Their continued presence has no fixed duration and thus,
cannot be considered "temporary."
As Sudomir departed from Holley, two more recent decisions
stand in direct contradiction to Sudomir. Consistent with Holley and
the statutory definition, these decisions take a more expansive view
of the term "permanent." In Gillar v. Employment Division, 23 for
example, the Oregon Supreme Court also confronted the question in
the context of asylum applicants. The court acknowledged the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Sudomir and flatly rejected it. Borrowing from
Judge Canby's analysis in his Sudomir dissent, the Oregon Supreme
Court held: "An alien awaiting action on an asylum application is
present in the United States with no defined end or defined purpose.
Thus, an asylum applicant fits within the statutory definition of 'per-
manent' rather than within the statutory use of 'temporary.' ",124
The court in Gillar also based its finding of "permanent" presence
on the fact that the status of an asylum applicant is analagous to
115. Id. at 1462.
116. INA § 101(a)(31), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(31).
117. Id.
118. Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1467 (Canby, J., dissenting).
119. See, e.g., INA § 101(a)(15)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (tourists); id., §
101(a)(15)(F)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i) (students).
120. Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1467 (Canby, J., dissenting).
121. See INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42) (definition of refugee) (empha-
sis added).
122. Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1468 (Canby, J., dissenting).
123. 300 Or. 672, 717 P.2d 131 (1986).
124. Id. at 682, 717 P.2d at 138.
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that of a temporary parolee. 125 The court noted that prior to the en-
actment of the asylum statute in 1980,126 temporary parole was used
to permit large groups of aliens to enter the country pending deter-
mination of their admissibility. "[The asylum statute], enacted as
part of the 1980 Refugee Act," the court stated, "replaced the provi-
sions allowing the wholesale parole of aliens with a system allowing
aliens within the country to apply for asylum.' 27 Thus, because
their status is so nearly identical to that of the pre-1980 parolees, the
court deemed asylum applicants to be "permanently residing."'2s
The Second Circuit similarly has taken an expansive approach to
interpreting the word "permanently." Berger v. Heckler 29 involved
judicial construction of a consent decree which entitled certain
noncitizens to SSI benefits. The Secretary argued that the consent
decree exceeded the scope of the SSI statute in that several of the
categories included "mere applicants" for various forms of immigra-
tion relief.130 Noting that those categories are limited to aliens
"whose departure the INS does not contemplate enforcing," the
court found that this "qualification satisfactorily reflects and en-
forces the 'permanently residing' requirement of the statute."' 131
The court also pointed out that the Secretary's restrictive interpre-
tation of "permanently" was inconsistent with the government's posi-
tion as set forth in its opposition to a petition for certiorari in Hol-
ley. The government had filed an amicus brief on behalf of
respondent Holley, urging affirmance of the Second Circuit's deci-
sion.132 In its brief, the government observed that the listing of the
two examples - conditional entrants and temporary parolees -
"obviously forbid any narrow reading" of "permanently,"' 3 3 Thus,
the Second Circuit rejected the Secretary's argument that an expan-
sive reading of "permanently residing" would bring the consent de-
125. See supra notes 13, 23, 35, 44 and accompanying text. As discussed by the
Gillar court, the "color of law" statutes and regulations all consider temporary parolees
to be "permanently residing." 300 Or. at 683, 717 P.2d at 139.
126. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
127. Gillar, 300 Or. at 684, 717 P.2d at 139.
128. Id. at 140.
129. 771 F.2d 1556 (2d Cir. 1985).
130. Id. at 1577 n.34.
131. Id.
132. The government's amicus brief stated that the views expressed therein were
formulated after consultation with HEW (now HHS), the Department of Labor, the
Department of Agriculture, and the INS. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Shang v. Holley, 435 U.S. 947 (1978), at 1. See also Berger, 771 F.2d at 1576
n.31.
133. Berger, 771 F.2d at 1576.
cree "into conflict with the underlying statute. '134
Although Berger did not involve asylum applicants, its reasoning is
directly applicable. Simply stated, the INS cannot "contemplate en-
forcing the departure" of any asylum applicant until the asylum
claim has been finally adjudicated. Application of this test mandates
that an asylum applicant be considered "permanently residing."'13
By utilizing an overly restrictive interpretation, the majority in
Sudomir wrongly denied benefits to asylum applicants. Contrary to
the court's assertion, an asylum applicant's "continued presence" is
not "dependent upon the possibility of having his application for asy-
lum acted upon favorably."'13 "Continued presence" is ensured by
INS policy. The court failed to focus on the individual's status at the
time of the eligibility determination. Instead, it refused to grant eli-
gibility because the asylum claim might ultimately be denied in the
future. The critical question, left unaddressed by the Ninth Circuit,
is whether one's existing status as asylum applicant is of a fixed,
time-definite nature or whether it is of an indefinite nature during
which time the INS cannot deport the applicant. Because their con-
tinued presence is guaranteed throughout the lengthy asylum process
by INS policy, 37 federal regulation1 8 and international treaty obli-
gations, 39 asylum applicants must be deemed "permanently resid-
ing" within the meaning of the subject phrase.
Asylum applicants are but an example of various categories of
noncitizens whose presence is to be considered "permanent" as they
await a final adjudication of their application for a change of status.
Others, such as applicants for "adjustment of status," are similarly
protected from deportation for an indefinite period during the pen-
dency of their application.140 Inclusion of these categories of "appli-
cants" within the meaning of the subject phrase underscores the
point that "permanently" cannot be construed according to its com-
mon usage. Rather, its statutory meaning allows for an individual's
134. Id.
135. Aside from the compelling legal arguments, color of law status should be con-ferred on asylum applicants based on policy considerations. Asylum applicants are per-mitted to remain in this country throughout the pendency of their asylum claim, a period
lasting as long as six years. As Judge Canby notes in his dissent in Sudomir, denial ofcolor of law status during this period will leave these persons without "the means to feed,clothe and house their families. I cannot ascribe to Congress, in passing the Refugee Act
for clearly humanitarian purposes, an intent to require victims of persecution to run that
kind of gauntlet." Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1468 (Canby, J., dissenting).
136. See id. at 1462.
137. See INS Form 1-589 4; see also supra note 113.
138. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(e)(2) (1986).
139. United States Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,189 U.N.T.S. 137; United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. The United States ratified
the Protocol on October 4, 1968. 114 CONG. REC. 29, 607 (1968).
140. See Papadopoulos v. Shang, 67 A.D.2d 84, 414 N.Y.S.2d 152, 154 (1979).
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presence to be permanent "even though it is one that may be dis-
solved eventually .... ,,14" This interpretation of "permanently re-
siding" is not only consistent with the statutory definition but pro-
vides the needed flexibility for applying the term to the ever-evolving
body of immigration law.
"Under Color of Law"
Not unlike the broad construction accorded the term "perma-
nently residing," the second part of the subject phrase - "under
color of law"- similarly "invites dynamic interpretation . . . in the
light of developments in the country's immigration policy. 11 42 In-
deed, Congress recently reaffirmed its intent that "the Secretary and
the States broadly interpret the phrase 'under color of law.' "143
As the Second Circuit observed in Holley:
The phrase obviously includes actions not covered by specific authorizations
of law. It embraces not only situations within the body of the law, but also
others enfolded by a colorable imitation. "Under color of law" means that
which an official does by virtue of power, as well as what he does by virtue
of right. The phrase encircles the law, its shadows and its penumbra. When
an administrative agency or legislative body uses the phrase "under color of
law" it deliberately sanctions the inclusion of cases that are, in strict terms,
outside the law but are near the border.
14 4
The court applied this definition to the facts of Holley. It found that
the noncitizen was residing under color of law because, although
technically here illegally, she was present with "the knowledge or




The INS was aware of Ms. Holley's presence, yet it chose to exer-
cise its discretion not to deport her. The federal government con-
ceded that her residence in the United States was "continued by vir-
tue of official permission or acquiescence."114" The court, therefore,
concluded that those individuals whose departure the INS "does not
contemplate enforcing [are present] under color of law. 1 47
Shortly after the Holley decision, two New York state court deci-
sions adopted the same reasoning. Both cases involved individuals
who entered the country as temporary nonimmigrants and subse-
quently applied for permanent resident status. In St. Francis Hospi-
141. INA § 101(a)(31), 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(31).
142. Berger, 771 F.2d at 1571.
143. H.R. REP. No. 727, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 111 (1985) (emphasis added).
144. Holley, 553 F.2d at 849-50. (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 849.
146. See Memorandum for the United States, supra note 132, at 4.
147. Holley, 553 F.2d at 849.
tal v. D'Elia,148 the alien was informed after her nonimmigrant visa
expired that there were delays in processing her immigrant visa ap-
plication. She received no further communication regarding her ap-
plication before she became ill and entered the hospital. Thereafter,
she applied for medical assistance.
The social services agency denied the application for medical as-
sistance and legal action ensued. The New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, relied on several factors in making its color of
law determination: her pending application for an immigrant visa;
the consular service's correspondence with her after the expiration
date of her nonimmigrant visa; and INS failure to deport her. The
factors impelled the conclusion that "at the time of her admission to
the hospital [she] was residing in this country under color of law. ' 149
In the other New York state court case, Papadopoulos v.
Shang,150 the alien suffered a stroke and was hospitalized while her
application for adjustment of status was pending. Although that ap-
plication was later denied, the INS considered "deferred action sta-
tus on humanitarian grounds." ' The court reviewed Mrs. Papado-
poulos' claim for Medicaid benefits. It held that because an
application for adjustment of status was pending and, under INS
Operating Instructions,152 the INS would not take any steps to effect
the alien's deportation, she was present under color of law.a' Under
the same reasoning, the court held that the alien was also here under
color of law while she awaited a ruling on her "deferred status.' 54
During both periods, the court noted, "she was not subject to depor-
tation either by reason of statute or regulation of the INS.' 55
These two decisions do differ in one respect. In making its color of
law finding, Papadopoulos relied on an actual INS regulation not to
deport. The court in St. Francis Hospital, however, %;as atisfied by
the mere acquiescence of the INS.156 Some courts have found this
148. 422 N.Y.2d 104, affid, 53 N.Y.2d 825, 440 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1981).
149. Id. at 110; see also Cruz v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 478 N.E.2d
1262 (1985) (INS acquiescence sufficient to establish "color of law" status).
150. 67 A.D.2d 84 414 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1979).
151. Id. at 86, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
152. INS Operating Instruction 01 242.1(a)(23) provides that where a petition for
adjustment of status is pending, "[tihe district director will not deport, or institute pro-
ceedings against, the beneficiary of the petition if approval of the petition would make
the beneficiary immediately eligible for adjustment of status under section 245 of the
Act." Section 245 requires that an immigrant visa be "immediately available" at the
time the adjustment application is filed. INA § 245(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(3).
153. Papadopoulos, 67 A.D.2d at 87, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
154. Id. at 87, 414 N.Y.S. 2d at 155.
155. Id.
156. When courts are confronted with INS acquiescence, they should, at a mini-
mum, require that the government come forward with proof of INS intentions consider-
ing the record of inaction. In Velasquez v. Secretary of Dep't of Health and Human
Services, 581 F. Supp. 16 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), the court addressed the "color of law" issue
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distinction significant and require more than INS inaction in the
face of an alien's continued residence.
157
This may be a distinction without a difference - particularly
when the acquiescence takes the form of the INS exercising its dis-
cretion not to deport. In Rubio v. Employment Division,158 for ex-
ample, the facts closely parallel those in St. Francis Hospital. The
INS, aware of the alien's presence while the application for perma-
nent residence was pending, granted extensions of voluntary depar-
ture and "had no intention of initiating deportation proceedings
against him.1159 In recognizing color of law status, the court charac-
terized this "active acquiescence" in the following manner: "At the
least, INS exercised its discretion not to enforce the law; more accu-
rately, it knowingly maintained the status quo pending the outcome
of claimant's application for permanent residence."
160
The Utah Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in finding
an applicant for suspension of deportation" 1 to be here under color
of law. In Antillon v. Department of Employment Security,1 62 the
court based its holding on the fact that the INS knew of the alien's
presence and "acquiesced in it by exercising its discretion not to en-
force the law."'163 Quoting Holley, the court added that "[tihere is
no more common instance of action 'under color of law' than the
determination of an official charged with enforcement of law that he,
as a matter of public policy, will exercise his discretion not to en-
force the letter of a statute or regulation . . .
in the context of an alien seeking SSI benefits who had applied for suspension of deporta-
tion (INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254). No hearing had been scheduled by INS on her
suspension application. The court remanded the matter to the Secretary for further ad-
ministrative proceedings "to permit [the Secretary] to satisfy her burden of establishing
that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in fact contemplates enforcing
plaintiff's departure from the United States." Velasquez, 581 F. Supp. at 17.
In placing the burden on the Secretary, the court noted the "unequal standing" of the
parties:
The Secretary has far greater access to the type of proof sought and is in a
position to establish procedures by which it can be obtained with little effort.
The usual lack of representation and indigent status of most Social Security
claimants similarly points in favor of placing the burden on the government
agency, as do considerations of fairness and social policy.
Id. at 18.
157. See Esparza v. Valdez, 612 F. Supp. 241 (D.C. Colo. 1985).
158. 66 Or. App. 525, 674 P.2d 1201 (1984).
159. Id. at 527, 674 P.2d at 1202.
160. Id. at 529-30, 674 P.2d at 1203.
161. See INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254.
162. 688 P.2d 455 (Utah 1984).
163. Id. at 459.
164. Id. at 458 (citation omitted).
In sharp contrast, a federal district court firmly rejected the "ac-
quiescence" test for determining color of law status. In Esparza v.
Valdez, an action involving unemployment insurance benefits, the
court reasoned that adoption of such an approach "would seriously
erode the government's ability to deal with the problem of illegal
aliens. '16 5 The court was also concerned that "any alien, without re-
gard to the legality of his entry, . . . [could] make his presence
known to the INS by the filing of some application, and, in the ab-
sence of deportation, claim that his residence was 'under color of
law.' "166 The court assumed that frivolous applications would be en-
couraged. This argument, however, ignores a basic reality: an un-
documented alien, without any claim to legal status, whose presence
is unknown to the INS, is highly unlikely to expose himself to the
INS and thereby risk deportation solely for the purpose of obtaining
unemployment insurance benefits.
Nonetheless, basing its holding on these flawed premises, the court
in Esparza concluded that color of law makes eligible "those aliens
who, after review of their particular factual circumstances pursuant
to a specific statutory or regulatory procedure, have been granted an
immigration status which allows them to remain in the United
States for an indefinite period of time."116'7 To the degree that this
standard requires the INS to affirmatively grant a particular status,
it unreasonably narrows the scope of color of law. It is illogical to
exclude from eligibility an individual who is protected from deporta-
tion not by an affirmative act of the INS but by a specific INS pol-
icy or regulation. When an INS regulation prohibits the deportation
of an individual, additionally demanding affirmative action by the
INS requires a superfluous act. Indeed, Congress has expressed its
intent that the requisite broad interpretation of "color of law" is not
limited to those instances in which the INS has affirmatively granted
a particular status. Instead, it should "include all of the categories
recognized by immigration law, policy, and practice." a68
Other than in Esparza, only two courts 69 have refused to recog-
nize the status of "permanently residing . . . under color of law" for
individuals specifically covered by an INS policy prohibiting depor-
tation during the pendency of their applications. Significantly, in
both cases, one member of the three-judge panels expressed disa-
greement with the majority analyses and urged that such persons are
165. Esparza v. Valdez, 612 F. Supp. 241, 244 (D. Colo. 1985). This argument,
however, has been rejected by the Supreme Court. See supra note 1.
166. Esparza, 612 F. Supp. at 244.
167. Id.
168. H.R. REP. No. 727, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 111 (1986) (emphasis added).
169. Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1985); Zurmati v. MeMahon,
180 Cal. App. 3d 164, 225 Cal Rptr. 374 (1986).
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"permanently residing . . . under color of law.117 0 In fact, in
Sudomir, the court conceded that the plaintiffs, applicants for asy-
lum, were present "under color of law" 117 and denied benefits solely
on the basis that they were not "permanently residing."17
12
In Zurmati v. McMahon,17 3 a California court of appeal relied
heavily on the Ninth Circuit decision in Sudomir. Ignoring the clear
INS policy not to deport asylum applicants,7 4 the court refused to
recognize color of law status because the claimant's presence was not
"the result of any affirmative admission or grant of status."' 75 One
of the members of the three-judge panel, however, filed a separate
opinion in which he stated: "I find the reasoning of Circuit Judge
Canby's dissent in Sudomir17 6 to be extremely persuasive and more
closely associated with the views to which I subscribe.' ' 77 Of the
twenty decisions surveyed, only Zurmati, Sudomir, and Esparza
have required an affirmative grant of status by the INS in order for
a noncitizen to establish that she is "permanently residing ...
under color of law."
A sounder approach, and perhaps somewhat of a middle ground
between St. Francis Hospital's "mere acquiescence" and Esparza's
"affirmative grant of status," was recently enunciated by the Oregon
Supreme Court. In Gillar v. Employment Division,17 8 the court ad-
dressed the color of law issue in the context of an asylum applicant
pursuing his claim before an immigration judge. The court clearly
required more affirmative action than mere acquiescence. Relying on
the asylum' 79 and withholding of deportation 80 statutes and regula-
tions, the court determined that the individual could not be deported
during the pendency of the asylum request.' 8 ' Therefore, the court
170. Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1467 (Canby, J., dissenting); Zurmati, 180 Cal. App.
3d at 177, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (Lui, J., concurring).
171. Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1461.
172. Id. at 1461-64.
173. 180 Cal. App. 3d 164, 225 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1986).
174. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
175. Zurmati, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 175, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 381; see also Sudomir,
767 F.2d at 1462 ("[presence] has not been legitimated by any affirmative act").
176. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
177. Zurmati, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 177, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (Lui, J.,
concurring).
178. 300 Or. 672, 717 P.2d 131 (1986).
179. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. 1158; 8 C.F.R. § 208.1-.10 (1986).
180. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) ("The Attorney General shall not deport
or return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's
life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.").
181. Gillar, 300 Or. at 679-81, 717 P.2d at 136-37.
concluded:
Rather than base our decision on INS inaction we believe that in order to
provide a particular individual with "color of law", the INS must take some
affirmative action or must have a policy prohibiting deportation ...
[S]uch a policy is apparent in the interrelationship of the 1980 Refugee Act
and the corresponding INS regulations. 8 2
One further issue regarding asylum applicants should be ad-
dressed at this point. The Ninth Circuit in the Sudomir case sug-
gested that an asylum applicant is not "permanently residing . . .
under color of law" because his presence is "illegal" until asylum is
granted.183 This position is inconsistent with congressional intent. In
its deliberations on the color of law standard, Congress considered
aliens granted indefinite voluntary departure or an indefinite stay of
deportation as satisfying such a standard."" Yet both of these
groups are deportable aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1251 and, technically,
illegally present in the United States. 8 5 Nonetheless, Congress con-
ferred color of law status because these aliens reside here with per-
mission of the INS. The same rationale applies with equal force to
asylum applicants who are protected from deportation, whether they
entered the country legally or illegally. Indeed, acknowledging the
conditions under which an alien flees persecution, Congress clearly
contemplated that the manner of entry might be illegal. Thus, the
statutory protections are afforded "irrespective of such alien's
status." 88
Some of the more creative approaches to color of law analysis
have arisen in the context of unemployment insurance benefits. De-
spite identical language in the various benefit programs, courts ap-
pear to be applying a particularly liberal construction. One court ex-
plicitly stated that different analyses might be appropriate for
unemployment claims versus more traditional welfare benefits: "Un-
like the AFDC claimant, one who files for unemployment has
worked and paid into an account with the expectation that insurance
182. Id. at 679, 717 P.2d at 136 (emphasis added).
183. In Sudomir, the court relied on the fact that the asylum applicants had "en-
tered or remained in the United States illegally and then applied for asylum." 767 F.2d
at 1462.
184. See note 57 and accompanying text. See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(a)(5), (6)
(1986) (conferring "color of law" status on these two groups and deeming them eligible
for SSI benefits).
185. See Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 585 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed
without published opinion, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The Attorney General is
authorized to allow certain classes of deportable aliens to voluntarily depart from the
United States. An alien in this instance admits to being in this country illegally .... ")
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). The status of aliens covered by an indefinite stay
of deportation or an indefinite voluntary departure is also akin to that of an asylum
applicant in that they "may remain in the country until, and only until, the INS takes
action to end their indefinite stays." Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1468 (Canby, J., dissenting).
186. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
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would be available if the need arose.
'187
The issue of employment authorization 88 has figured prominently
in the unemployment compensation cases. Many courts, in fact, have
granted color of law status on the principal basis of an individual's
receipt of employment authorization. Utilizing such reasoning, a re-
cent Florida court of appeals decision found Haitian aliens awaiting
the initiation of deportation proceedings to be "permanently residing
. . .'under color of law.' ",189 The court based its finding on the fact
that "[a]lthough the five appellants are subject to being excluded or
deported at some time in the future, if the government pursues and
prevails, they have, nonetheless, been given alien identification cards
and authorizations to work. . .."1,90
Four Colorado state court decisions 91 similarly place great weight
on the INS granting employment authorization to the individual
claiming color of law status. Unlike the Florida case, however, each
noncitizen applied for and was awaiting adjudication of either an
application for asylum or for adjustment of status.
The first case, Arteaga v. Industrial Commission,1 92 involved an
individual who entered the country illegally. During his period of
employment, however, he applied for permanent residence and was
covered by INS work authorization. The court recognized color of
law status because the INS was "fully aware of his technically ille-
gal presence and yet consented to it by suspending efforts to deport
him and by authorizing him to work." '193 Thus, Arteaga stands for
the proposition that manner of entry into the country is irrelevant to
color of law status. The court in Yatribi v. Industrial Commis-
1194otesion, on the other hand, simply looked to the date on which the
187. Gillar, 300 Or. at 685 n.13, 717 P.2d at 140 n.13.
188. See 8 C.F.R. § 109.1 (1986) (authorizing applicants for various forms of im-
migration relief to apply for and receive employment authorization).
189. Alfred v. Florida Dep't of Labor and Employment Sec., 487 So. 2d 355, 357
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
190. Id. at 358-59 (emphasis in original).
191. Division of Employment & Training v. Industrial Comm'n, 705 P.2d 1022
(Colo. App. 1985), affid sub nom. Division of Employment & Training v. Turynski, No.
855C240 (Colo. Apr. 6, 1987); Zanjani v. Industrial Comm'n, 703 P.2d 652 (Colo. App.
1985); Arteaga v. Industrial Comm'n, 703 P.2d 654 (Colo. App. 1985); Yatribi v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 700 P.2d 929 (Colo. App. 1985). The Colorado Supreme Court consoli-
dated for hearing and affirmed Zanjani and Arteaga in Industrial Comm'n v. Arteaga,
No. 855CI27 (Colo. April 6, 1987).
192. 703 P.2d 654 (Colo. App. 1985).
193. Arteaga, 703 P.2d at 657. Zanjani, decided less than two months later by the
same judge, employed identical reasoning. 703 P.2d at 654.
194. 700 P.2d 929 at 931 (Colo. App. 1985).
applicant for adjustment of status had been granted employment au-
thorization and awarded unemployment benefits from that time.
In the third Colorado decision, Division of Employment and
Training v. Industrial Commission,"" Polish asylum applicants
sought unemployment benefits for periods when their asylum appli-
cations were pending. The court based its color of law finding on two
factors: the INS grant of employment authorization, and the policy
not to deport during the pendency of an asylum application. These
factors demonstrated the agency's intent to allow asylum applicants
to remain in the United States.
These cases reveal a doctrinal trend under which, at least in the
unemployment insurance context, "color of law" status is recognized
for persons with work authorization. A remaining question is
whether the absence of work authorization is fatal to eligibility for
unemployment compensation. This query was answered, for the mo-
ment, by the recent case of Ibarra v. Texas Employment Commis-
sion.198 If Ibarra stands for nothing else, however, it vividly demon-
strates that the issue of color of law, particularly in the area of
unemployment insurance, is producing a volatile body of law.
In Ibarra, a class of noncitizens challenged the state requirement
that applicants for unemployment benefits must produce documents
showing that the INS authorized them to work. The State of Texas
required work authorization for the period of employment on which
eligibility was based. During the course of litigation, the state re-
versed itself and announced that it would no longer require INS
work authorization.1 97 Its change of position was attributed to an
amicus brief submitted by the federal government. The brief stated
that work authorization was not mandated by federal law or the De-
partment of Labor (DOL).198 The parties then submitted a proposed
final consent decree that defined "permanently residing in the United
States under color of law" to mean "aliens of whose presence in the
United States the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is
aware and with regard to whom there has been an affirmative case-
specific or class specific determination that allows the alien to remain
in the United States for an indefinite period of time."1 99
After the state conceded that it would no longer require INS work
authorization, however, DOL shifted its position and insisted that
195. 705 P.2d 1022, 1023 (Colo. App. 1985).
196. 645 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
197. Ibarra, 645 F. Supp. at 1063.
198. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 38, at 6-7; see also lbarra, 645
F. Supp. at 1063-64. The federal government could no longer assert such a position given
the enactment of employer sanctions under IRCA. IRCA § 101(a), 100 Stat. at 3360
(amending/adding INA § 274A).
199. Final Consent Decree 4-5 (Feb. 22, 1986). Attached as Appendix to Final
Judgment, Ibarra, 645 F. Supp. at 1064 (emphasis in original).
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the state could not waive its requirement that unemployment com-
pensation claimants produce work authorization to prove "availabil-
ity for work" 200 while they received benefits. 20 1 On this basis, the
State of Texas sought to set aside the agreed upon consent decree.
The federal court viewed DOL's new position as an attempt to
equate INS work authorization with an alien's legal availability for
work. "Yet, the federal statute that the DOL is interpreting does not
mention the availability for employment requirement,0 2 and the
Texas statute does not have the word 'legal' modifying 'availability
for work.' ",203 Furthermore, the court reasoned, the Supreme Court's
decision in Sure-Tan v. United States20 4 was distinguishable because
in Sure-Tan the "unavailable for work" finding was compelled by
the undocumented workers' voluntary departure and return to Mex-
ico. By contrast, the Ibarra court found that
the aliens covered by the consent decree are lawfully entitled to be present
and employed in the United States. They are legally present because they
are permanently residing in the United States under color of law, and they
are legally entitled to employment because the United States and the State
of Texas do not prohibit the employment of aliens.
20 5
200. In addition to the requirement that an alien be present "under color of law at
the time such services were performed," the State of Texas, as do other states, requires
that the unemployed individual be "available for work" at the time he or she seeks bene-
fits. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-2(d) (1971). Thus, eligibility must be
established at two points in time: (1) for the period of employment on which the claimant
is basing eligibility and (2) at the time at which benefits are sought. The former require-
ment is mandated by federal law, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (1982), while the latter is
imposed at state option.
201. Ibarra, 645 F. Supp. at 1065.
202. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(l)(14)(A) focuses solely on the alien's status "at the time
such services were performed." (emphasis added) Thus, any state's attempt to deny ben-
efits on the basis of the alien's status at the time benefits are sought may be found
inconsistent with congressional intent. Indeed, in enacting section 3304(a)(14(A), Con-
gress considered and rejected a version of the bill which would have conditioned eligibil-
ity for unemployment compensation on the alien's status "at the time the benefits are
claimed." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 158, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 98, 103.
203. Ibarra, 645 F. Supp. at 1071. But see Alonso v. State, 50 Cal. App. 3d 242
(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976) (construing CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1253's
"available for work" provision as requiring "legal availability").
204. 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (denying backpay award under National Labor Rela-
tions Act to discharged alien employees who were not legally available for work).
205. Ibarra, 645 F. Supp. at 1071. See Local 512, Warehouse and Officer Work-
ers' Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986) (awarding backpay to undocumented
alien employees, who remain in the United States and thus are "available for work," as a
remedy for the employer's violation of the National Labor Relations Act). In Local 512,
the court also noted that if benefits were denied to the alien employees, it would en-
courage "[u]nscrupulous employers" to exploit such workers due to the creation of "an
environment relatively free of labor safeguards." Local 512, 795 F.2d at 719.
At the time, this reasoning was based on a sound analysis of the
Supreme Court's approach in Sure-Tan. The Sure-Tan Court found
that it was not "unlawful for an employer to hire an alien who is
present and working in the United States without appropriate au-
thorization ... ."206 With the passage of employer sanctions in
IRCA, however, it is now unlawful for an employer to hire an alien
who does not have employment authorization. °7 Thus, while the
question of whether states can lawfully impose an "availability for
work" requirement may remain a point of contention, 20 8 the issue of
whether an alien without employment authorization satisfies this re-
quirement has been resolved. One cannot be considered "available
for work" if it is illegal for one to be hired.
Regardless of the impact of employer sanctions or the absence of
employment authorization on noncitizen eligibility for unemploy-
ment insurance, Ibarra significantly advances the doctrinal develop-
ment of color of law. The court ultimately approved entry of a final
consent decree that defined color of law in the same manner as the
proposed decree.20 9 By including categories such as applicants for
asylum and for adjustment of status within the color of law defini-
tion, the decree acknowledges that an INS policy prohibiting depor-
tation is sufficient to confer color of law status. Such a definition is
consistent with the Gillar case. The decree also specifically excludes
persons who rest their claim solely upon the fact that the INS is
aware of their presence and has yet to take steps to deport them,21 0
thereby rejecting the "mere acquiescence" 2111 rationale. In sum, the
language of the consent decree comports with the view, initially ex-
pressed in Holley,21 2 that color of law includes those persons of
whom the INS is aware and whose departure the INS does not con-
template enforcing.
Lending yet further support for this position, the Second Circuit
decision in Berger v. Heckler demonstrates the continued vitality of
Holley. In Berger, as noted in the discussion of "permanently resid-
ing," 213 the Secretary of Health and Human Services challenged a
consent decree regarding the eligibility of certain aliens for SSI ben-
efits. The original consent decree defined certain categories of
aliens 214 as under color of law but added: "Any other alien residing
206. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892.
207. INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
208. See supra note 202.
209. Ibarra, 645 F. Supp. at 1066 n.6.
210. Id.
211. See e.g., St. Francis Hosp. v. D'Elia, 422 N.Y.2d 104, affd, 53 N.Y.2d 825,
440 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1981).
212. Holley, 553 F.2d at 849-50.
213. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
214. These categories included: (1) aliens admitted as conditional entrants pursu-
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in the United States with the knowledge and permission of the
[INS] and whose departure from the United States the [INS] does
not contemplate enforcing is also permanently residing in the United
States under color of law .... "I"
The district court later amended the decree to include eleven addi-
tional categories of eligible aliens as well as a general policy stating
that an alien in a particular category will be considered as one 
whose
departure the INS does not contemplate enforcing "if it is the policy
or practice of the INS not to enforce the departure of aliens in 
such
category.1 216 This amendment did not meet with the Secretary's 
ap-
proval. She challenged it principally on the ground that it is ultra
vires because it conflicts with the underlying statute. She also argued
that the amendment is ultra vires as exceeding the scope of the 
orig-
inal decree.217 As to the latter argument, the Secretary maintained
that the language of the original decree "is properly interpreted 
to
cover only those aliens as to whom there has been an official deter-
mination or authorization, embodied in a letter, that the alien is 
le-
gitimately present in the country for an indefinite 
period of time. '21
8
The court dismissed, as having no merit whatsoever,
219 the Secre-
tary's attempt to restrict the decree's effect to Holley's limited
facts. 220 The court noted that Holley had been decided during 
the
year before the consent decree was entered and that the federal gov-
ant to INA § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7); (2) aliens paroled pursuant 
to INA §
212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5); and (3) aliens residing in the United 
States pursuant
to an order of supervision, indefinite stay of deportation, or indefinite 
voluntary depar-
ture. Berger, 771 F.2d at 1560.
215. Berger, 771 F.2d at 1560.
216. Id. at 1576-77 n.33. The additional categories include, 
inter alia, persons
awaiting INS adjudication of a change in status and whose departure 
the INS does not
contemplate enforcing. Id.
217. Id. at 1570.
218. Id. at 1575.
219. Id. at 1576.
220. The Second Circuit previously has refused to limit its decision 
in Holley to
the facts presented. On remand to the District Court, Holley v. Lavine, 
464 F. Supp. 718
(W.D.N.Y. 1979), afl'd, 605 F.2d 638 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Blum 
v. Holley, 446 U.S.
913 (1980), the Court denied the defendants' request to restrict declaratory 
and injunc-
tive relief to the narrow facts of Ms. Holley's individual case. Holley, 
464 F. Supp. at
721. The Court held that its determination that the state statute 
was inconsistent with
the federal regulation required it to declare the New York statute 
"invalid insofar as it
denies public assistance to New York residents permanently residing in 
the United States
under color of law" and permanently enjoined the defendants from 
enforcing the statute.
Id. On appeal, the Second Circuit specifically found that the scope 
of relief ordered by
the district court was consistent with "[the Court of Appeal's] earlier 
mandate." Holley,
605 F.2d at 647.
ernment, in an amicus brief urging affirmance of the decision,221 hadopposed the petition for certiorari. 222 In its brief, the government ar-gued that the phrase "'residing under color of law' includes, at least,residence continued by virtue of official permission or acquies-cence. '223 The court thus concluded that "the government's contem-poraneous interpretation of Holley lends support to an expansiveview of the consent decree, rather than a restrictive one.M2 4In rejecting the Secretary's argument that the amended decreeconflicts with the underlying statute, the Second Circuit character-ized the phrase "under color of law" as "an open vessel - to begiven substance by experience."225 The Secretary argued that Con-gress intended the "color of law" language to confer eligibility onlyon refugees and those who entered the country prior to June 30,1948.226 The court examined thoroughly the legislative history227 ofthe phrase and concluded that Congress never contemplated the re-strictive interpretation preferred by the Secretary.228 Rather, theBerger court described the standard as "expansive and elastic" andinviting "dynamic interpretation . . . in the light of developments inthe country's immigration policy." 229
A PROPOSED GUIDELINE FOR APPLYING THE "PERMANENTLY
RESIDING UNDER COLOR OF LAW" STANDARD
Situations may exist in which either INS inaction regarding analien's application for lawful status230 or mere acquiescence in analien's presence23 1 are sufficient to establish that an individual is"permanently residing . . . under color of law." Generally, however,an affirmative act by the INS permitting the individual to remain 232or a policy or practice prohibiting deportation during the pendencyof an application for lawful status233 should be required.
221. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
222. Berger, 771 F.2d at 1575-76.223. See Memorandum of Amicus Curiae for United States Department of Laborand United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra note 38, at 4.224. Berger, 771 F.2d at 1576.
225. Id. at 1574.
226. Id. at 1572.
227. Id. at 1573-75.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1571.230. See Antillon v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 688 P.2d 455 (Utah 1984); St.Francis Hospital v. D'Elia, 422 N.Y.2d 104, aff'd, 53 N.Y.2d 825, 440 N.Y.S.2d 185(1981).
231. See Alfred v. Florida Dep't of Labor and Employment Sec., 487 So. 2d at355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).232. See Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom.Shang v. Holley, 435 U.S. 947 (1978).233. See Gillar v. Employment Div., 300 Or. 672, 717 P.2d at 131 (1986); Ibarrav. Texas Employment Com'n, 598 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
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Most judicial constructions of the subject phrase discussed in this
Article contain terminology requiring yet further definition to ascer-
tain a precise meaning. Although perhaps workable in the context of
particular facts, they may not be adaptable for general purposes.
Use of the term "indefinite" in defining the duration of one's status,
for instance, can be ambiguous, since the INA does not define that
term. Similarly, a determination of whether the INS "contemplates
enforcing" an individual's departure could require one to conjecture
about subjective INS intent.
In an effort to avoid these pitfalls yet maintain sufficient flexibility
in applying the subject phrase to an array of individualized fact situ-
ations, the following definition is proposed:
"Permanently residing under color of law" includes those persons not pre-
cluded by the INA (section 101(a)(15)) from establishing residence in the
United States who, pursuant to INS policy or practice, are entitled to re-
main here so long as they continue in their current status.
Application of this definition will ensure continued adherence to
congressional intent in enacting the color of law standard. That in-
tent is to exclude from benefit eligibility those persons temporarily or
not lawfully present.23 4 Furthermore, by utilizing the INA definition
of "permanently," this proposed guideline addresses the "perma-
nently residing" concept in a legally precise and manageable man-
ner. As previously discussed, "permanent" status is defined by distin-
guishing it from a temporary one.235 Persons with "no intention of
abandoning" their foreign residences are enumerated in section
101 (1)(15) of the INA as those classes of aliens who are temporarily
present.236 If an individual does not fit one of the section 101 (a)(15)
categories and is thus "not precluded by the INA from establishing
residence in the United States," she is "permanently residing"
within the meaning of the subject phrase. The Ninth Circuit in
Sudomir23" 7 would have undoubtedly reached a different conclusion
and thereby avoided its tortured analysis of "permanent" by simply
looking to the statutory definition.
The second part of the definition excludes undocumented aliens
and limits color of law status to those persons who are present with
the knowledge and permission of the INS. The language "pursuant
to INS policy or practice" ensures that, consistent with congressional
234. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
purposes, z38 presence "under color of law" is not restricted to those
instances in which the INS has affirmatively granted a particular
status. Rather, it can include the following circumstances: (1) an in-
dividualized letter from the INS indicating an intent not to deport;
(2) a specific case determination that the INS will not deport; or (3)
an INS policy not to deport. Such policy can be based on statutes,
regulations, operating instructions, or simply on practice.
The phrase "so long as they continue in their current status" ad-
dresses the issue of the appropriate time frame for examining one's
immigration status. For instance, individuals cannot be denied color
of law standing because, at some point in the future, their applica-
tion for adjustment of status or asylum might be rejected by the
INS. The focus must be on the "current status"2 39 and whether a
policy or practice exists prohibiting deportation "so long as they con-
tinue" in that status. Failure to adhere to this approach could leave
courts in the awkward position of making color of law determina-
tions based on the likelihood of ultimate favorable action by the
INS. Given the unpredictable and often arbitrary actions of the
INS,2 40 this type of judicial "coin-flipping" is ill-advised.
CONCLUSION
The leading court to construe "permanently residing . . . under
color of law" has described the phrase as "adaptable and to be inter-
preted over time in accordance with experience, developments in the
law, and the like. In this sense the phrase is organic and fluid, rather
than prescriptive or formulaic."2 411 This description is a particularly
fitting characterization that properly reflects congressional intent.
Any attempt to narrowly construe the standard would frustrate these
purposes and result in unwarranted denial of subsistence benefits to
indigent aliens entitled to remain in the United States.
Congress has recently expressed interest in refining the color of
law test. If Congress wants to provide the courts and administrative
agencies with further guidance in interpreting the phrase, its interest
would be best served by setting forth a definition with plain meaning
rather than by exhaustive or internally inconsistent listings of cate-
gories of aliens. Any listing could prove to be underinclusive in that
it necessarily excludes future categories of aliens that may be cre-
238. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
239. Holley utilized the same approach by looking to whether INS "contem-
plate[d] enforcing her departure from the United States at this time." Holley, 553 F.2d
at 850 (emphasis in original).
240. See e.g., E. HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF ALIENS (1985).
241. Berger, 771 F.2d at 1571.
[VOL. 24: 411. 1987] Eligibility for Public Benefits
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ated by our volatile immigration laws.242 Any effort to so restrict the
phrase would thus leave insufficient flexibility to accommodate these
subsequent changes in the law.
Finally, despite passage of IRCA and its planned effect on illegal
immigration, Congress will undoubtedly remain under increasing
pressure from certain special interest groups. These groups can be
expected to take up the refrain that "illegal" immigrants are lured
into this country by the availability of public benefits. Congress' re-
sponse to the serious and complex issue of controlling our borders
must not be swayed by xenophobic hysteria. Neither should it come
at the expense of the real needs of noncitizens in this country. Denial
of subsistence benefits to individuals lawfully present would only cre-
ate hardship and despair while undermining the fair and just appli-
cation of our laws.
242. In only the past two years, Congress has considered, and in certain instances
created, several new categories of aliens, including persons covered by various "legaliza-
tion" programs and others accorded temporary relief from deportation. See, e.g., H.R.
3810, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 121(c) (1985); IRCA § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3396 (amend-
ing/adding INA § 245A).

